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· ,. PREFACE 
The writing of this thesis has bee~ a tiring, enjoyable, :Qustrating and 
challenging experience. M.,Bergson has introduced me to ·a whole new way of doing 
. . 
philosophy which has put vitality into the process. I have caught a Bergson bug. His 
vision of a collaboration of philosophers using his intuitional m~thod to correct, each 
others' work and patiently compile a body of philosophic know: ledge is inspiring. I 
hope I have done him justice in my description of that vision. If I have succeeded 
and that vision catches your imagination I hope you Will make the effort to apply it. 
Please let me know of your effort, your successes and your failures. With the 
current challenges to rationalist epistemology, I believe the time has come to give 
Bergson's method a try. 
My discovery of Bergson is. the culmination of a development of my thought, 
one that started long before I began my work at Oklahoma State. However, there 
are some people there who deserv~. special thanks for awakening me from my 
' "''' 
analytic slumber. Doren Recker showed me logic was a game -- an enjoyable game, 
but a game all the same -- and Ed Lawry opened my eyes to the sins of reason. For 
all his enthusiasm and the many book loans, ~ tha:qk him. , 
My committee, Dr. Neil Luebke, Dr. Robert Radford and, again, Dr. Lawry 
were helpful with their comments and direction. I must also thank Dr. Richard , 
' ' ' 
Eggerman for his input on Kant. Special acknowledgement must be made to Dr. 
Pete Gunter, who consented to reading u~shed'portions of this manuscript and 
provided me with copies of many of his articles on Bergson. His time and 
encouragement added depth to the final work. All of these gentlemen provided 
iii 
sounding boards for my developing understanding of Bergson, but of course, if I 
have failed to understand him, the fault is mine, not theirs. 
I am deeply grateful for the support of my family, who always believed I 
could see this project through to its end in the allotted time. Special thanks go to 
my two moms: to Mom Hoff for travelling cross-country to celebrate the completion 
of the project and to Mom Fisher for Matter and Memory -- you cannot know how 
much I appreciated your gift. John and Nancy Davis are like family, and like family 
they provided much needed support -- and the use of their laser jet printer. Thanks 
also to Adrian, for just being himself and bringing me back to earth from time to 
time. 
More than thanks go to my husband Dave -- for assuming the proper 
expression and nodding at the appropriate times whenever I tried to explain 
something about Bergson to him -- and also for cleaning, changing diapers, making 
dinner, changing diapers, doing laundry, changing diapers, giving me space and 
changing diapers. I never could have made it without your support. This paper is 
dedicated to you; I hope it is worthy of that dedication. 
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Henri Bergson was born in 1859, the same year Darwin's Origin of the 
Species was published. Evolutionary theory was to have a large impact on his 
thought.1 His early studies were in mathematics, in which he excelled. At the age of 
nineteen, having won a national award for his solu~ion of a mathematical problem, 
he was poised for a brilliant career in the sciences. He chose philosophy instead.2 
His doctoral dissertation, Essai s:ur les donnees immediates de la conscience 
(English title: Time and Free Will), was published in 1889. It went practically 
unnoticed although in it he first presented his novel conception of duration. He 
followed the Essai with Matiere et memoire (Matter and Memo:ry) in 1896. Ian 
Alexander calls Matter and Memo:ry "the bed-rock of Bergsonism."3 It is a tightly 
argued, complex presentation of Bergson's theories of perception and the 
" " 
mind/body relation, yet it also rec~ived polite reviews and was forgotten.4 Relevant 
to the study of Bergson's method is. the artiCle Introduction ala metaphysique ("An 
1Frederick Cople~ton, S.J., A Histo:ry of Philosophy, vol 9: Maine de Biran 
to Sartre (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1985), p. 194. 
2Pete Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and 'The Evolution of Science," in The 
Evolution of Physics, trans. and ed. P. A Y. Gunter (Knoxville: The University of 
Tennessee Press, 1969), p. 4. 
'• 
3Ian W. Alexander, Bergson: Philosopher of Reflection (New York: Hillary 
House, Inc., 1957), p. 30. 
4Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and The Evolution of Science," p. 12. 
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Introduction to Metaphysics"), published in Revue de metaphysique et de morale in 
1903.5 
However, it wasn't until the publication of L 'Evolution creatrice (Creative 
Evolution) tha:t Bergson made his mark on the world. In it the duration Bergson 
had introduced in the Essai flowered into the elan vital, the life-force behind 
evolution. Creative Evolution presents ~·a metaphysical vision on a grand scale."6 
With its publication-Bergson became famous overnight -- and not only famous, but a 
fad. 
He was a dynamic speaker, drawing standing room only ~rowds. Gabriel 
Marcel describes how Bergson's students at the College de Fran<,:e "submitted to the 
course of Mr. Leroi Beaulier --submitted, rather than listened ---so as to be there 
when [Bergson] arrived.''7 The Paris newspapers began to debate whether Bergson's 
classes should be moved to the Paris Opera in order to facilitate the crowds.8 
In 1914 Bergson resigned his teaching post, feeling his credibility was 
compromised by his popularity.9 In 1924 he came down with severe arthritis, 
curtailing his ability to work. During the period after his resignation he released 
two collections of essays and lectures, L 'Energie spirituelle (Mind-Energy) in 1919 
~ . 
and La Pensee et Ia mouvant (The.Creative Mind) in 1934. His last major work, Les 
Mind. 
5"An Introduction to Metaphysics" was later republished in The Creative 
6Pete Gunter, Henri Bergson: A Bibliography, rev. 2nd ed. (Bowling Green, 
OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 1986), 
p.4. ' 
7Gabriel Marcel in Thoma& Hapna, ed., The Bergsonian Heritage, (Ne,; 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 124. · . 
8Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and The Evolution of Science," pp. 15-16. 
9Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and The Evolution of Science," p. 16. 
2 
Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion (The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion) was published in 1932. Bergson died January 4, 1941 in Paris. 
Although Bergson was extremely popular in his day, his popularity did not 
outlive him. 
When we look at Bergson's position-- or rather lack of position-- in today's 
intellectual life, we find it hard to imagine that some decades ago he was not 
just a famous thinker and wliter; in the eyes of Europe's educated public he 
was clearly the philosopher, the intellectual spokesman par excellence of the 
~ffi - . 
- . 
Leszek Kolakowski charges a lack of method for the walling of Bergson's 
popularity: "Bergson ... offered no applicable 'method' apart from his own results; 
he inspired other people, but left them no ready-made instruments for further 
research."11 The reason for this, according to Kolakowski, is that an intuitional 
method, beyond interpersonal or aesthetic empathy, is impossible.12 Julien Benda, 
a contemporary of Bergson and one of his most vocal critics, agrees that Bergson's 
philosophy cannot provide a method and is patently irrational.13 Pete Gunter, one 
of Bergson's few modem suppo~ers,_points out that it is plausible to question 
whether intuition can have .a method -- and in one sense of the word ("rules which 
would automatically en5uie success") an intuitional J;D.ethod is impossible.14 
There are two basic mis~onceptiorn of Bergson's philosophy which led his 
critics to believe that he had no workable method. Gunter summarizes them as 
follows: 
p.l. 
10Leszek Kolakowski, Bergson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
11Kolakowski, p. ·101. 
12Kolakowski, pp. 35-36. 
13Kolakowski, p. 88. . 
14Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and its Applications to the 
Sciences," The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 16 (Fal11978):172. 
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Those who, like Bertrand Russell or George Santayana, attacked Bergson for 
introducing intuition as a veritable mode of knowledge, have done so not only 
because Bergson's intuitionism seenis to lead to a dangerous kind of anti-
intellectualism but because it also seems to culminate in a conceptually 
baffling, inexpressible experience: a conceptual cui de sac from which there is 
no semantic or syntactical exit.15 
The two criticisms of Bergson's method, then, are that it is irrational and that it is a 
"dead end."16 -
Berg~on. has consistently been labelled an "irratio:rtalist."17 Bergson critiques 
intellect, and in away similar to Kant,.~ttempts to limit its sphere. This criticism has 
been taken to be a complete denial of any va.lidity to intellect or science. Cornelius 
Benjamin notes that a difficulty in Bergson's- intuitive method is that "it seems to 
displace science and render all its conclusions worthless. But Bergson cautions 
against this inferenc~ .. .''18 Julien Ben4a, 19 Bertrand Russell20 and Jacques 
Maritain21 found no reason to accept that caution and concl~1ded that Bergson is an 
irrationalist. 
Because his critics ri:risunderstand that Bergson sees intuition and intellect-
working together, they also see intuition as a dead end. Benda thought Bergson's 
. . . 
intuition was "a barbarous appeal to passive emotions" which resulted in an 
15Gunter, Henri Bergson: A Bibliography. p. 6. 
16Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and its Applications to the 
Sciences", p. 168. . 
17Kolakowski, p. 24. 
18A Cornelius Benjamin, "Intr:oduction to Metaphysics," in World 
Philosophy: Essay Reviews of 225 Major Works, ed. Frank N. Magill, vol. 4: 1896-
1932, (Englewood'Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press, 1982), p.1586. · 
19Kolakowski, p. 88. 
'20Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Bergson," The Monist 22 (July 
1912):323-326. . . 
. . . 
21 Jacques Maritain, Ber sonian Philoso h and Thomism, trans. Mabelle L. 
Andison in collaboration with J. Gordon Andison New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1955), pp. 146-147, 132; and Ransoming the Time, trans. Harry Lorin 
Binsse, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,-1941), pp. 65-67. 
4 
inexpressible and unverifiable insight. Therefore, "it was· incapable, in spite of all 
Bergson's claims, of working out a 'method' or of yielding any re~ults."22 W. T. 
Jones is mystified that Bergson wrote conceptually argued books about 
epistemological and metaphysical theory based upon an inexpressible intuition.23 
Kolakowski concludes: 
On this point it would be hard to clear Bergson of the charge of inconsistency. 
On the one hand he does assert that the insight he praises is indeed performed 
without symbols and that whatever cognitive gains we get from it are inevitably 
distorted in symbolic representation; in other words, intuition is 
incommunicable. On the other hand, he calls intuition a 'method', thereby 
suggesting that it might become a common good; he calls it 'metaphysics' as 
well, and it is hard to tell how an incommunicable metaphysics is 
conceivable.24 ' ' 
Both the charge of irrationalism and that of uselessness rest on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Bergson'sconceptions of intellect and intuition 
and their relation. Bergson both proposed and used an intuitional method, one in 
which intuition and intellect complemept and critique each other. I intend to show 
that Bergson's philosophic method is neither irrational nor useless. 
To do so, Bergson's idea of the nature of philosophy and philosophic method 
must be considered. Next, a clear understanding of his critique of intellect is 
necessary, as well as an explanation of intuition. Once we have clarified how 
Bergson views intellect, intuition and philosophic method we can take an in-depth 
look at his method. There we will see that Bergson's method involves a creative 
interchange between intuition and intellect. By showing that intellect plays an 
important (albeit not the central) role in Bergson's method, the clai!l!S of 
irrationalism can be refuted. Also, it will become evident that the interaction of 
22Kolakowski, p. 88. 
23W. T. Jones, A Histo:ry ofWestern Philosophy,, 2nd ed., vol. 4: Kant to 
Wittgenstein and Sarte (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), p. 267. 
24Kolakowski, pp. 28-29. 
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intuition with intellect provides a means of expression and verification for the 
method's discoveries, removing any claims that Bergson's intuition is useless. 
6 
CHAPTER II 
PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD 
A Definition of Method 
In order to discuss Bergson's philosophic method we must first determi:rle 
what Bergson means by "philosophy'' and in what sense we can call intuition a 
"method". As noted in the introduction, Gunter. can understand why Bergson's 
critics felt intuition could not constitute a method. If by method it is meant "rules 
which would automatically ensure success~" then there cannot be an intuitional 
method.1 
· That is not to say the.re is no senSe of the word "method" which can be 
' 
applied to Bergson's use of intuition. The word "method" comes to us from the 
Greek "meta" meaning "after" and ~'hodos" meaning "way, road or joumey.''2 We can 
view "method", then, as designating a way of going along a road. It is not necessary, 
however, for all travel to have a specif:i,c goal or a guarantee of success. We may set 
; 
out on a trip looking for adventure; although not certain of our exact destination 
and without a guarantee of finding anything. 
The metapho~ of travel with a general ~ but no specific destination or 
guarantee of success is in line with Bergson's view of reality as process. That his 
method does not consist in performing the correct steps and thereby coming up with 
1Gunter, "Bergson's Philo~ophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 172. 
2A Concise Greek-English Dictionacy of the New Testament, 1971 ed., s.v. 
"hodos". · · 
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a guaranteed result is in keeping with his denial of a mechanistic view of the. 
universe.3 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "method" as "a special form of 
procedure adopted in any branch of mental activity, whether for the purpose of 
. teaching and exposition, or for that of investigation. and inquiry."4 This definition 
does not imply that there must be deafly stated rules, always followed in the same 
order, with a guarantee of success. Bergson's method, however, corresponds most 
·. ' 
closely with an alternate definition: "the· rules and practice proper to a particular 
art."5 
Gunter considers the intuitional method an art: 
Perhaps what we are looking for is not method, but genius.· In one respect it 
must be admitted that this objection is valid. That is, it must be admitted that 
for Bergson the quest for intuition is an art, for which rules that would 
automatically ensure success can.not be given.6 
I think this conception of Bergson's method as art is the most fitting. Artists go 
' ' 
about their work in an organized way, but they cannot be certain that what they 
create will be a masterpiece. It is'the same with Bergson's philosophic method. 
There is a way of proceeding, there are ·things to be done in' order to pursue an 
intuition, but they are flexible and do not guarantee results. It is in this sense that I 
will use the word "method" in this essay. 
3Copleston, p. 194. 
4ne Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s. v. "method". Definition 2a. 
5The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s. ~."method". Definition 2b. 
6Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 172. 
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Philosophy and Reality 
According to Copleston "[Bergson] had his own idea of the nature and 
function of philosophy; and his way of philosophizing, and even his style, were 
connected with this idea. 7 Bergson would accept the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of metaphysical philosophy as "that department of knowledge or study 
which deals with ultimate reality."8 However, as a process philosopher his view of 
"ultimate reality" differs from that of su~stance philosophers, thereby altering his 
conception of philosophy and its method. 
With reference to the nature of philosophy, Bergson maintains--arid here too 
he is following the tradition--that philosophy is pure theory. Yet theory, as this 
attitude and mode of cognition were conceived in Greek philosophy, was 
understood as knowledge of the permanent and static. Moreover, theory was 
possible since there was a permanent object to be kilown, like Plato's ideas or 
Aristotle's pure form. Bergson maintains that thoughJheory is directed 
towards the knowledge of things as they really are, he takes a different 
position as to the nature of things and of reality 'in general .... Bergson views 
- change and motion as the essence of reality.9 ·. 
In a letter written in 1923, Bergson describes mobility as the "leading idea" of 
all his work. The key to all philosophical problems is "to see in mobility the only 
reality that is given."10 The·name Bergson gives to the mobility which is reality is 
. .. 
"duration." 
For Bergson, the essence of reality is duration.11 Duration is tinie, but not 
time as measured by a clock; it is t4ne as we live it.12 Duration is a flow of 
7 Copleston, p.- 180. · 
Bne Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "philosophy". 
9Nathan Rotenstreich, "Bergson and the Transformations of the Notion of 
Intuition," Journal of the History·ofPhilosophy, 10 (July 1972):341. 
1°Kolakowski, p. 12. 
11Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D., 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), p. 272. 
12Creative Mind, p. 12. 
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creativity.13 It is "the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future 
and which swells as it advances."14 Reality is process. 
Mobility, or duration, is the central and all-encompassing idea of Bergson's 
philosophy. This mobility doesn't happen to things -- it just happens. Inf act, "there 
are no things, there are only actions."15 , 
There are changes, but there are underneath the change, no things which change: 
change has no need of a support. There are movements, but there is no inert or 
invariable object which moves: movement does not imply a mobile.16 
Our concepts of static things, substances which may undergo change but 
which remain essentially themselves are not_ true pictures of reality. Everything is 
change - not something changing, but change itself. 
To tell the truth, there never is real ·immobility, if we understand by that an 
absence of movement. Movement is reality itself, and what we call immobility 
is a certain state of things analogous to that produced when two trains move at 
the same speed, in the same direction, on parallel tracks: each of the two 
trains is them immovable to the travellers seated in the other.17 
Mobility doesn't happen in time; it is time. It is duration. Bergson's view of 
the world is not of things, which go through changes as they pass through time. 
Reality does not consist of time and change added to things; it is time itself, flowing 
and changing without any "things" at all. 
' ' 
Still Bergson speaks frequently of matter and of duration's effort to flow 
through, around or in spite-of ~atter.18 For this reason there is some question as to 
whether Bergson is a dualist or not. He can be read as viewing reality as containing 
13Creative Evolution, p. 11.· 
14Creative Evolution,,p. 4. 
15Creative Evolution, p. 248. 
16Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison, (New 
York: The Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 173. ·, · 
17Creative Mind, p. 169. 
18Creative Evolution, p. 181. 
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two elements: mobile duration and static matter. Hanna maintains that Bergson 
affirmed "a clear-cut metaphysical dualism which makes an absolute distinction 
between two realities: the reality of life or spirit and the reality of matter."19 
If there are two realities so completely opposed, Bergson will need two 
philosophic metho_ds. But is Bergson a dualist? He calls Matter and Memory 
"frankly dualistic"20 and does oppose science and philosophy, matter and spirit, 
duration and space through~ut his writings. 21 
I maintain, however, that he is not a dualist. Alexander explains: 
In actual fact, the reality is, for Bergson, a process of which the temporal and 
the spatial are the two sides, the' one corresponding to the contraction of 
consciousness, the other to the expansion of its material projection. 
We have, therefore, to do away with the old dualism of mind and matter. 
All reality is tendency, "a nascent change of direction."22 
Bergson viewed reality exclusively as duration, alth?ugh it consists of 
multiple durations of different rhythms. There is a continuum of dmations from 
matter's brief, repetitive pulses of duration to pure spirit's eternal, living duration.23 
Thus Deleuze calls Bergson's ontology a monism encompassing a limited 
pluralism.24 There is oniy one duration, but it contains varying rhythms. Each 
rhythm is qualitatively different from the others, thus there are true differences in 
kind between them (not just differences in degree). Yet all are aspects of the one 
' 
duration which encompasses reality. 
19Hanna, p.- 5. · 
20Henri Bergson, -Matt~r and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. 
Scott Palmer, (New York; Zone Books, 1988), p. 9. 
21Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1988), pp. 21-22. 
22Alexander, p. 41. 
23Creative Mind, p. 221. 
24Deleuze, p. 82. 
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Although Bergson calls himself a dualist in Matter and Memory he 
differentiates himself from "ordinary dualism." Ordinary dualism admits of n? 
continuum between matter and mind; they are absolutely separate. Bergson~s 
"dualism" includes "an infinite number of degrees be1:Ween matter and fully 
developed spirit."25 Matter is instantaneous duration-- a pulsing devoid of memory. 
Each rhythm of duration -is differentiated by the greater amount of duration which it 
holds in its existence as memory. Each l~vel retains "a~ ever higher degree of the 
past in order to influence ever more deeply the future."26 But all of these rhythms 
- . 
of duration take place within the flow of ~bsolute duration, which encompasses all 
of the past. In it we live and move and have our beirig.27 
Whether we c~ this view a modified dualism, a special monism or a limited 
pluralism, it is apparent that all reality is duration on one level or another and 
therefore philosophy must be able to apprehend duration through its method. 
If philosophy is to gain knowledge of ultimate reality, it must begin by 
apprehending change.28 
We said there is more in a movement than in the successive positions 
attributed to the moving object, more in a becoming than in the forms passed 
through in turn, more in the evolution of form than the forms assumed one 
after another. Philosophy can tijerefore derive terms of the second kind from 
those of the first, but not the first, fr~m the second; from the first terms 
speculation must take its start?~ 
Bergson maintains that intL;rition alone apprehends ultimate reality, so it must 
be the central element of a philosophic method. According to Bergson intellect 
makes the error of starting with immobility and,trying to recreate mobility, but we 
25Matter and Memory, p. 221. 
26Matter and Memory, p'. 222. 
27 Creative l\1ind, p. 186. 
28Rotenstreich, p. 343. 
29Creative Evolution, p. 316. 
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have another faculty which begins with mobility: intuition.30 Therefore, Bergson 
uses an intuitional philosophic method. To see why intuition is more suited to 
apprehend duration than intellect let us examine Bergson's critique of intellect and 
his theory of intuition. 
30Creative Mind, pp. 38-39. 
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CHAPTER ill 
BERGSON'S CRITIQUE OF INTELLECT 
Evolutionary Account of Intellect 
Philosophy is the study of reality and reality is duration according to Bergson. 
Can we gain knowledge of reality through our Cu.stomary mode of thought, 
intellect?1 
Bergson was highly critical of the ability of intellect to apprehend reality and 
to practice philosophy. It is partly this ·critique of intellect which has earned 
Bergson the epithet of "irrationalist". It is ironic that Bergson's critique of intellect 
was so poorly received, when one realizes that what Bergson was doing was a 
continuation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reaso!l, which was widely accepted at the 
tim. 2 e. 
Bergson was disturbed by Kant's acceptance that all knowledge is relative3, 
but he accepted Kant's critique. The faculty Kant critiques is, in general, the same 
faculty Bergson labels "intellect."4 They agree that intellect imposes its own form on 
reality, does not apprehend reality as it is in itself, and commits philosophical 
1Creative Mind, p. 208. 
· 
2Margaret W. Landes, "A Su_ggested Interpretation of Bergson's Doctrine of 
Intuition," Philosophical Review, 3~ (September 1924):457; and A D. Lindsay, The 
Philosophy of Bergson (Port Washington, NY: Kenriikat Press, Inc., 1968), p. 12. 
3Creative Mind, p. 42, Alexander, pp. 9-10. 
4Landes, p. 459. 
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mistakes when it attempts to make conclusions about the nature of reality.5 The 
difference lies in Bergson's contention that a second faculty of knowledge exists 
which does attain absolute knowledge.6 
Bergson takes Kant's critique and adds to it. Kant described the intellect as 
an a priori aspect of humanity. He does not know why the intellect is as he describes 
it.? As an evolutionary philosopher, Bergson pro~des an evolutionary explanation of 
' ' 
the operations of iritellect. Bergson viewed intellect as a successful adaptation of 
humanity to its environment. 
We regard the human intellect, on the contrary, as relative to the needs of 
action. Postulate action, and the very form of tpe intellect can be deduced 
from it. This form is therefore neither irreducible nor inexplicable.8 
This evolutionary explanation results in a rosier picture of intellect than Kant 
develops. Bergson claims that intellect does know "things-in-themselves," although 
' ' ' 
only in part, and that absolute knowledge, of reality is possible.9 
Bergson is an empiricist. Knowledge begins for him, therefore, with 
perception. Perception, however, is not purely speculative -- it is not there simply to 
5Landes, p. 458; Creative Evolution, pp. 203-205; Matter and Memmy, 
p. 16. 
6Landes, p. 459; Creative Mind, pp. 164-165. 
7Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, unabridged ed., trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p: 161; Kant, Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics, in Classics of Western Philosophy, 2nd ed:, ed. Steven M. 
Cahn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), p., 885; Gunter, "Introduction to 
the UP A Edition of Creative Evolution", in Creative Evolution, p. xxvii; Creative 
Evolution, p. 205. , 
8Creative Evolution, p. 152. 
p. 42. 
9Matter and Memory, p. 230; Creative Evolution, p. 230; Creative Mind, 
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provide us with knowledge of the external world.10 Perception is shaped along the 
needs of action.11 
Bergson describes the evolution of intellect most completely in Creative 
Evolution.12 Ufe needs things from matter to continue to live. In order to get these 
things, life must act. In its development of means to take from matter what it needs, 
life had two choices. It could adapt itself to fit exactly to matter in just such a way as 
to receive from it what it needs, or it could adapt itself to be flexible to take from 
matter what it needs in a variety of ways: The first solution results in instinct, the 
second in intellect.13 
Reality, as we have stated, is duration -- a continual flow of change. 
Perception, however, is of distinct objects: Perception, since it is a faculty tied to 
our need for action, is only interested iri ·certain aspects of reality. It hones in on 
things which are useful or dangen;m.s for us. 
. ' 
This discrimination is not conscious. At its most basic level perception is 
simply our reaction to. the world arourid us.14 If we were instinctual this reaction 
would occur automatically and unconsdously.15 However, we are intellectual 
beings. We have developed a faculty for flexible use of the matter which surrounds 
us.16 It is this freedom of choic~ which·generates consciousness.17 Since intellect is 
10Matter and Memo:ry. p. 28 . 
. 
11~reative Evolution,_p. 12,206, 300; Matter and·Memo:ry. p. 158. 
12Creative Evolution, pp. 137-165. 
13Creative Evolution, pp. 142-143. 
14Matter and Memo:ry, p. 32. 
15Creative Evolution, p. 145; Matter and Memo:ry, p. 32. 
16Creative Evolution, pp. 137-139. 
17Creative Evolution, p. 262. 
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a flexible means of obtaining life's needs from matter, it often has to choose 
between various courses of action.18 There is a hesitation to our response while we 
consider our options and it is this hesitation which is consciousness.19 
The courses of action available to us must be laid out for intellect, before it 
can choose. Where unconscious perception -is an immediate and actual action; 
conscious perc,eption is a layout of our potential actions.20 Therefore we perceive 
objects arrayed around us, snme closer and some farther away,,the closest clearly 
perceived, the furthest blending into a horizon where distinct objects cannot be 
distinguished. This perception is a layout of objects upon which we can act, ranked 
according to the immediacy of our action upon them. Those closer are the ones we 
can act upon the easiest, those farther away are not yet within the range of our 
influence. 21 
We do not lay out all of the flow of duration, but just those aspects which are 
of interest to us as we decide' upon our ~ction. We cut out of the flow of reality the 
parts that interest us, marked out along the lines of our action. 
The bodies we perceive are, so to speak, cut out of the stuff of nature by our 
perception, and the scissors follow, m some way, the marking of lines along 
which action might be taken.22 · 
In order to cut duration along the .lines of action our perception is shaped by space. 
The whole of matter is niade to appear to our thought as an immense piece of 
cloth in which we can cut out what we will and sew it together again as we 
please. Let us note, in passing, that it is this power that we affirm when we say 
that there is a space, that is to say, a homogeneous and empty medium, infinite 
and infinitely divisible, lending itself indifferently to any mode of 
18Creative Evolution, pp.143-145. 
19Creative Evolution, p. 144. 
2°Creative Evolution, pp. 11-12. 
21Matter and Memory, pp. 20-21. 
22Creative Evolution, p. 12. 
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decomposition whatsoever. A medium of this kind is never perceived, it is 
only conceived. 23 
Just as Kant held that perception was through the form of space, 24 Bergson 
maintained that our intellect views reality through a matrix of space which is a 
conception itself and not actually part of reality. Using this "infinitely divisible" 
medium as the form of our perceptions aJ.lows us to consider any potential line of 
action we choose. 
Our perception, however, is not entirely arbitrary. Remember that the initial 
content of our perceptions is our natural reactions to the world around us. The 
matter of perception is real -- although it does not represent the. complete matter of 
reality-- it is the form which is imposed by our need of action.25 We do not entirely 
construct the object, we carve it out arid give it a shape which is riot part of reality, 
but the matter does exist.26 
This perceptive activity takes time. "However brief we suppose any 
perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves, consequently, 
an effort of memory which prolongs one into another a plurality of moments."27 We 
compr~ss into one perception a number· of instantaneous impressions of reality. It is 
the common characteristics of the inst~taneous impressions which we perceive as 
the object's essence.28 Rather than viewing the object ill the rhythm of its duration, 
we view it in the rhythm of our own, compressing the many instants of its rhythm 
that occur in one pulse of ours into one perception. Thus perception gives us only 
23creative Evolution, p. 156. 
24Critique, p. 67. 
25Creative Evolution, p. 149. 
26nis position differs from Kant's. He insists that nothing of the .object 
itself is known, even in part. cf. Critique, pp. 73-74. 
27Matter and Memory, p. 34. 
28Creative Evolution, p. 328. 
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part of reality -- that which interests us -- abstracted from duration and placed in 
space. 
Intellect recognizes perceptions as instances of general ideas. Bergson 
provides an evolutionary explanation of this process, also.· The groupings of objects 
into genera is based upon the common reaction these objects elicit from us.29 Just 
as in Kant perception is completed by conception, 30 in Bergson perception is not 
complete until memory associates the object with a general idea.31 This is a 
necessary process to enable us to choose our reaction from the possibilities 
perception has laid out for us.32 
I 
The essential function of our intellect as· the evolution of life has fashioned it, 
is to be a light for our conduct, to make ready for our action on things, to 
forsee, for a given situation, the events, favorable or unfavorable, which may 
follow thereupon. Intellect therefore instinctively selects in a given situation 
whatever is like something already known; it seeks this out, in order that it 
may apply its principle that "like produces like."33 
Our experienced perception is of the object spatialized and generalized. 
"Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is 
impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it."34 
Perception is of ''whatever is like something already known" not only of the object 
itself. 
Thus as intellect completes its conceptualization of the object we are left 
with a partial view of reality removed from duration and impregnated with memory 
images which emphasize its characteristics common to other objects. We have lost 
:r9Matter and Memmy, pp. 158-160. 
30c · · 93 nt1que, p. . .. 
31Matter and Memory, p. 33. 
32Matter and Memory, p. 65. 
33creative Evolutio!l, p. 29. 
34Matter and Memory, p. 133. 
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the object's wholeness, duration and uniqueness. We have not, however, lost the 
object entirely.35 
It is important to note here-that matter's duration is pure repetition.36 
Therefore it approaches, although it does not quite reach, pure spatiality.37 Thus 
the proportion of the object lost in the conceptualization of matter is minimal. 
Therefore intellect is well-suited to science, that is the study of matter,38 although it 
fails miserably at metaphysics, as we shall see. 
Intellect and Metaphysics 
Kant limited human knowledge to the objects of possible experience and 
possible experience to that which could be intuited through space and time and 
categorized by the understanding. The obje~s of metaphysics could not be 
experienced in this waY., although we create ideas of them as ultimately unified 
realities. These ideas serve a regulatory function, aiding in the categorization of 
perceptions by serving as a goal. 
Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of 
concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas, 




However, if we postulate true existence for these ultimately unijied ideas, we are 
creating illusion.40 Thus, for Kant,-m~t.aphysical science is impossible.41 We cannot 
obtain knowledge of ultimate realities. 
35Matter and Memo:ty. p. 71. 
36Creative Mind, p. 221. 
37Creative Evolution, pp. 206-207, 219. 
38creative Mind, p. 41. 
39Critique, p. 533. 
40Critique, p. 533. 
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Bergson is still in agreement with Kant. He, too, describes how intellect 
continues its conceptual activity outside of its appropriate sphere and thereby 
creates fallacious ideas of metaphysical objects.42 
Because our perception is incomplete, we complete it with conception.43 
Once we have our static perception of things and seek to act upon them, we must 
again consider movement and change in order to conceive of our action causing the 
end desired.44 We picture the state of things before our act and the state of things 
after our act; we cannot picture the change from ~ne to the other because intellect 
does not apprehend the mobility of duration.45 
We are aware, though, that a change has occurred; all our faculties are 
adapted to achieving desired changes. Therefore we create an abstract idea of 
movement or change with which to string together the series of static states of affairs 
we perceive. 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are 
characteristic of the reality~ we have only to string them on a becoming, 
abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of 
knowledge, in order to Imitate what there is that is charactenstic in this 
becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general.46 
This idea of change is not empirical; it is an imitation of re"al duration. In the 
same way we create other abstract ideas used to reconsti!ll;te reality. Bergson 
discusses in particular the abstract id,eas of "multiplicity, "unity," and "time."47 
41Copleston, p. 304. 
42Creative E~olution, p. 273; Matter and Me~my, p. 16. 
43Creative Mind, pp. 156-158. 
44Creative Evolution, pp. 299-300. 
45creative Evolution. p. 299. 
46Creative Evolution, p. 306. 
47Creative Evolution, p. 257, 21. 
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We also create pseudo-ideas by using practical concepts speculatively. For 
example, when we consider the possibility of an action we mean only that there is 
"no insurmountable barrier to its realization."48 That action is within our power of 
choice. When we speculate on possibility, however, we create the idea of the action 
itself, hovering just offstage, completely formed before its realization.49 This 
"possible" is, by definition, outside of our experience. It is not an empirical idea. 
So, with Kant, Bergson agrees that the intellect should not do metaphysics. 
Its attempts to do so result in false conceptions which do not reflect reality. He does 
not agree, however, that metaphysics is entirely impossible. Because he has 
explained how these ideas are developed he has revealed hpw to avoid a false view 
of reality and obtain a true experience of duration. 
As we have shown, intellect does not touch reality absolutely; it apprehends 
only a portion of reality. It overlooks all of reality which falls outside of its interests. 
If we could find a faculty which was disinterested, then we could experience all of 
reality. 
It is interesting to note that Kant examines briefly an alternate mode of 
knowing, one which he stated only God possessed. In one place he says, "An 
understanding in which through self-conSciousness all the manifold would eo ipso be 
given, would be intuitive; our understanding can only think, and for intuition must 
look to the senses."50 Again he says, "An understanding which through its self-
consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition--an understanding, that 
is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at 
the same time exist--would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act 
48Creative Mind, p. 22. 
49Creative Mind, pp. 21-22. Bergson' discusses other pseudo-ideas. We will 
deal with the pseudo-idea of nothing in the chapter on method. 
5°Critique, p. 155. 
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of synthesis of the manifold."5~ Copleston describes Kant's position: "But realities, if 
there are any, corresponding to the transcendental Ideas cannot be given in 
experience in the absence of any faculty of intellectual intuition. "52 
Bergson agreed with Kant's critique of intellect. He has only two objections 
to Kant's position. Fir~t, that intellect does appreh~nd part of reality and is not, 
therefore, entirely ignorant of things-in-themselves, and second, that the inadequacy 
of intellect is caused by its interested nature and therefore, by suppressing interest, 
we can regain the direct intuition of reality which Kant deemed-impossible. 
Intellect and Language . 
Before discussfug this disinterested faculty of kn~wledge, it is necessary to 
make a few observations about intellect and language. 
Language is the child of intellect. Language mirrors intellect's spatialized, 
abstract vision of reality. "We break up this continuity into elements laid side by 
side, which correspond in the one case to distinct words, in the other to independent 
objects."53 
Language is a tool for action, as an our faculties are. 54 Like intellect, 
language is flexible and thus words are 'Qlobile. A given word can be transferred 
from one object to another. 55 
It is language's mobility which has created in humanity the ability to form 
general ideas and the desire to pbilosoph;ize. 
51Critique, p. 157. 
52Copleston, p. 305. 
53Matter and Memo:ry, p. 183. 
54Creative Evolution, p. 158. 
55Creative Evolution, p. 158. 
[A word] can therefore be extended, not only from one perceived thing to 
another, but even from a perceived thing to a recollection of that thing, from 
the precise recollection to a more fleeting image, and finally from an image 
fleeting, though still pictured, to the picturing of the act by which the image is 
pictured, that is to say, to the idea. 56 
Language makes conceptualization possible and invites intellect to 
disinterested speculation. 
From the moment that the intellect, reflecting upon its own doings, perceives 
itself as a creator of ideas, as a faculty of representation in general, there is no 
object of which it may not Wish to have th~ idea, even though that object be 
without direct relation to practical action. 7 
Intellect creates formal knowledge which gives humanity the idea of a 
complete knowledge, even of things which have no'practical use. Intellect invites 
theory, but cannot attain it. 58 
Intellect does not apprehend duration. Thus it is unsuited for philosophy. 
However, intellect itself seeks theory. It is intellect which reveals to us the need for 
intuition. 
56ereative Evolution, p. 159. 
57Creative Evolution, pp. 159-160. 




Instinct, Intellect and Intuition 
We have discussed how intellect is unable to apprehend reality and is 
therefore unsuited to philosophy. Coming to a similar conclusion Kant decided that 
metaphysics is impossible. Bergson does not. 
Bergson agreed, as I have said, with Kant's critique of intellect. He stated 
that the "greatest service" Kant performed for philosophy was having established 
... if metaphysics is possible, it can be so only through an effort of intuition.--
Only, having proved that intuition alone would be capable of giving us a 
metaphysics, he added: this intuition is impossible.1 
According to Bergson, Kant (and all other philosophers) accepted the 
assumption that perception's purpose is purely speculative, and therefore decided 
that if this purely speculative faculty had failed at speculation, true reality would 
never be apprehended through it. Kant decided only an intellectual apprehension 
of reality could solve the problem, and such an intellectual apprehension is 
impossible.2 Bergson, however, begins from the premise of perception's action-
orientation. Perception has not been used purely speculatively -- but perhaps the 
experiment can yet be made. 
It is his evolutionary description of intellect which brought Bergson to this 
conclusion, and again evolution would provide the key to the solution. Perception 
1Creative Mind, p. 165. 
2Creative Mind, p. 165. 
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and intellect need not have evolved as they did. In fact, evolution took a different 
path in the case of insects, culminating in instinct.3 Instinct involves immediate 
knowledge of reality. Bergson describes instinct as "molded on the very form of 
life."4 In instinct life itself is known exactly as it is in the flow of duration. Yet 
instinct, like intellect, is interested -- it must seek out a particular quality upon which 
to act. Intellect, as we have noted, achieved this ability of discriminating qualities by 
cutting them out of the flow of reality and apprehending them as distinct objects. 
Instinct, on the other hand, finds the quality it needs by narrowing its scope and 
responding only to that quality. Intellect has partial knowledge of all objects while 
instinct has complete knowledge of just one. 
As we have said, intellect through its formal knowledge leads to speculation. 
The theory it develops can never be correct because of intellect's inability to 
apprehend reality. Instinct, on the other hand, apprehends reality, but because of its 
limited scope has no conception of speculation. Bergson concludes: "There are 
things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These 
things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them."5 
There is hope of resolvillg this impasse. Since both instinct and intelligence 
evolved from the same basic tendency, there are elements of each in the other.6 
Humanity retains some instinct. By combining the scope of intellect with the 
immediacy of instinct direct knowledge of reality will be possible. 
One stumbling block to this effort is t~at instinct is unconscious. It responds 
automatically to its object, thus there is no need of the hesitation which creates 
3Creative Evolution, p. 143. 
4Creative Evolution, p. 165. 
5Creative Evolution, p. 151. 
6Creative Evolution, pp. 135-136, p. 142. 
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consciousness. Bergson distinguishes the type of unconsciousness in instinct 
carefully. This unconsciousness is not the absence of consciousness (as a stone is 
unconscious) but the nullifying of consciousness as when humans perform a habitual 
action mechanically, without thinking.? Thus consciousness is a possibility for 
instinct.8 If we C3:fl develop instinct, bring it to consciousness and widen its scope to 
a greater number of objects we would have a speculativ:e faculty of knowledge.9 
Intuition is such a faculty. "By intuition," Bergson writes, "I mean instinct that has 
become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of 
enlarging it indefinitely."10 
Describing this intuitive faculty is difficult. Bergson asks that "no one ask me 
for a simple and geometrical definition of intuition."11 Just as "that which is 
instinctive in instinct cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence,"12 intuition, as an 
enlarged and conscious form of instinct, is outside of intellect's realm of knowledge. 
\ ' 
Intuition itself must be intuited. Let us make some observations which may lead us 
'• 
to a glimpse of intuition..13 Bergson states that something intuitional cannot be 
communicated ''unless one takes view~ of it that are multiple, complementary and 
not at all equivalent."14 · 
7Creative Evolution. pp. 143-145. 
8Creative Evolution, p. 143. 
9Creative Evolution, p. 165. 
1°Creative Evolutio~ p. 176. 
11Creative Mind, p.·37. · 
12Creative Evolution, p. 168. 
13Creative Mind, p. 195. 
14Creative Mind, p. 38. 
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There are those who interpret Bergson as saying that intuition is instinct. 
Bertrand Russell defines Bergson's intuition as "instinct at its best,"15 and quips that 
"instinct is seen at its best in ants, bees, and Bergson."16 K W. Wild equates instinct 
and intuition.17 He says "when an instinct ... has been reflected upon and had its 
object enlarged at will, it is nothing more or less than an analysed instinct.tt18 
Bergson does describe instinct and intuition in parallel ways. He calls both 
of them "sympathy"19 and contrasts both of them to intellect.20 He uses the words 
"instinct" and "intuition" in parallel passages: 
H~t we ~ust .not for~t that there still hangs round the edge ~f intelligence a 
frmge of mstinct . . . , 
But we know that all ar~und intelligence there lingers still a fringe of intuition, 
vague and evanescent. 
However, intuition is not instinct, nor is it glorified instinct. "Intuition is 
neither instinct, nor intelligence, but in a sense both."23 We must remember that 
Bergson draws his distinctions more cle'arly than they really are in order for us to see 
the differences in kind between instinct, intellect and intuition. He warns us: 
15Russell, p. 324. 
16Russell, p. 323. cf. Gun~er, "Bergsonian Method and The Evolution of 
Science," p. 25. , 
17K W. Wild, Intuition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 
pp. 6-9. 
18Wild, p. 6. 
19Creative Evolution, p. 176; Creative Mind, p. 190. 
2°Creative Evolution,·pp. 167-168; p. 267. 
21Henri Bergson, The Two Sourc~s of Morality and Religion, trans. R. 
Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1935), p. 118. 
~wo Sources, p. 212. 
23 Alexander, p. 54; cf. Gunter, Bibliography. p. 6. 
28 
The reader must expect to see in what follows only a diagrammatic drawing, in 
which the respective outlines of intelligence and instinct are sharper than they 
should be, and in which the shading-off which comes from the indecision of 
each and from their reciprocal encroachment on one another is neglected. In 
a matter so obscure, we cannot strive too hard for clearness. It will always be 
easy afterwards to soften the outlines and to correct what is too geometrical in 
the drawing--in short, to replace the rigidity of a diagram by the suppleness of 
life.24 
Because his objective is to show clearly, the inadequacies of intellect for 
philosophy and, in contrast, intuition's suitability for metaphysics he most often 
discusses the incompatibilities of the two.25 
Yet, intuition has aspects in common with intellect. It too is conscious26 and 
it is flexible, able to apprehend durations of various intensities21. Margaret Landes 
maintains: 
... if we tum back to the Introduction to Metaphysics where Bergson's doctrine 
of intuition is more concisely and completely stated than in any other of his 
writings, we find scattered but unambiguous expressions and statements to the 
effect that intuition is not absolutely opposed to the intellectual method, but 
rather supplements it.28 
She cites as examples29 Bergson's descriptions of intuition as "intellectual 
sympathy,"30 "intellectual auscultation,"31 "intellectual expansion,"32 and "intellectual 
24Creative Evolution, p. 137. 
25Creative Mind, pp. 38-39. 
26Creative Mind, pp. 35-36. 
27Creative Mind, p. 221. 
28Margaret W. Landes, "A Suggested Interpretation of Bergson's Doctrine 
of Intuition," Philosophical Review, 33 (September, 1924):453. 
29Landes, pp. 453-4S4. 
30Creative Mi~d, p. 191. "sympathiser intellectuellement," Henri Bergson, · 
Oeuvres, edition du centenaire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 
p. 1396. 
31Creative Mind, p. 206. The Andison translation differs, calling it spiritual 
auscultation. In Oeuvres, "auscultation spirituelle," p. 1408. 
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intuition,"33 as well as his contention that intuition is expressible by concepts, albeit 
more flexible concepts than intellect uses. 34 
Intuition is, then, a mixture of instinct and intellect, but this combination is 
not achieved by synthesizing the two. Intellect cannot re-absorb instinct.35 Intuition 
is a return to the "ocean of life" as it is before its division into instinct and intellect. 
... a beneficent fluid baths us~ whence we draw the very force to labor and to 
live. From this ocean of life, in which we are immersed, we are continually 
drawing something, and we feel that our being, or at least the intellect that 
guides it, has been formed therein by a kind of local concentration. 
Philosophy can only be an effort to dissolve again into the Whole.36 
Because both intellect and instinct have developed away from the same principle, 
one cannot re-absorb the other,37 but they can be re-absorbed by the principle 
itself.38 
Intuition, therefore, has connectiops to both intellect and intuition. Intellect 
apprehends matter, while instinct apprehends life. "Between these two extreme 
limits moves intuition, and this movement is metaphysics itself."39 
As Bergson describes it, intuition would be suited to philosophy. But is there 
such a faculty and can it be used in a philosophic method? 
32Creative Mind, p. 216, 231., The Andison translation renders this "dilation 
of the mind." In Oeuvres, "dilatation de !'esprit," p. 1415 and "dilatation de notre 
esprit," p. 1428. 
33creative Mind, pp. 230-231. 
34Creative Mind, 198: 
35creative Evolution, p. 168. 
36Creative Evolution, p. 191. 
37Creative Evolution, p. 168. 
38Creative Evolution, p. 191, 193. 
39Creative Mind, p. 221. 
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The Possibility of Intuition 
There is one aspect of intuition which is not like either instinct or intellect: 
intuition is disinterested.40 Intuition grasps reality as it is, rather than picking ~ut of 
it those aspect which interest us. "We must strive to see in order to see," Bergson 
commands us, "and no longer see in order to act."41 
Since intuition is not developed by combining intellect and instinct, which 
humans do posses, but by rediscovering the root from which they have sprung, and 
since intuition, unlike any other human faculty, is disinterested, it is appropriate to 
ask whether the discovery or development of such a faculty in humanity is possible. 
Bergson admits the difficulty of an effort to reverse the direction of intellect 
and return to a direct vision of reality, but insists that such an effort is not 
impossible.42 He claims that all"durable" philosophical systems are the result of 
just such an intuitive glimpse of reality.43 In his lecture "Philosophical Intuition" he 
cites Berkeley and Spinoza as examples.44 The intuition which motivated his own 
work was the vision of time as real duration.45 
40Creative Evolution, p. 176. 
41Creative Evolution, p. 298. 
42Creative Evolution, pp. 237-238. 
43Creative Evolution, p. 237; Creative Mind, pp. 127-132. 
44Creative Mind, p. 133. 
45Creative Mind, pp. 10-13. 
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Bergson presents the examples of artists and aesthetic perception as evidence 
of a latent faculty of intuition in humanity.46 Composers, (he mentions Beethoven 
explicitly) are intuitive.47 
But now and then, by a lucky accident, men arise whose sense or whose 
consciousness are less adherent to life. Nature has forgotten to attach their 
faculty of perceiving to their faculty of acting. When they look at a thing they 
see it for itself, and not for themselves. They do not perceive simply with a 
view to action; they perceive in order to perceive -- for nothing, for the 
pleasure of doing so.48 
Artists see for "pleasure"; they see in order to see rather than to ·act. Mystics also 
receive intuitions. 49 
It is not just special minds -- artists, mystics and philosophers -- that 
experience intuition. In the "Introduction to Metaphysics,',' Bergson writes: 
32 
There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and 
not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self 
which endures. With no other thing can we sympathize intellectuall~0 or if you like spiritually. But one thing is sure: we sympathize with ourselves. 
In Creative Mind he writes, "The experiment was within reach of everyone, and 
those who were willing to make it had no difficulty in getting an idea of the 
substantiality of the ego, as of its duration. "51 We all experience the flow of our own 
inner duration as it is. We do not spatia.Iize it. We do not view changes in ourselves 
as separate, distinct states succeeding each other, but as an interpenetration, a 
flowing of past into present. We do recognize novelty in ourselves. We see our 
46Creative Mind, pp. 159-160. 
47Two Sources, pp. 252-Z53. 
48creative Mind, p. 162. 
49Two Sources, pp. 249-250. 
5°Creative Mind, p. 191. 
51creative Mind, p. 83. 
various moods as qualitatively different. Like need not produce like; we intuit 
ourselves as free. 
Thus it is evident that humanity has an intuitive faculty. 52 It is rarely used 
and underdeveloped, but it is there. It can be "methodically cultivated and 
developed,"53 though not without effort. 
[Our rriin.d] can be installed in the mobile reality, adopt its ceaselessly 
changing direction,jn short, grasp it intuitively. But to do that, it must do itself 
violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks, 
continually upsetting its categories, or rather, recasting them. 54 
In response to those who considered intuition as mere feeling Bergson says, "I 
repudiate facility. I recommend a certain manner of thinking which courts difficulty; 
I value effort above everything."55 
That an intuitive faculty can be developed, however, is not sufficient to 
establish the possibility of an intuitive philosophy. An intuitive faculty, no matter 
how completely developed, would be useless if its discoveries cannot be expressed. 
Expressing Intuition 
We have discussed the relationship between language and intellect above. 
Words and objects correspond, both cut out of the flow of reality by intellect. 56 
Intuition is of that flow, uncut. How, then, can language be used to express 
intuition? This question has been asked by many of Bergson's critics. 57 
52creative Mind, .p. 53. 
53creative Mind, p. 92. 
54creative Mind, p. 224. 
55Creative Mind, p. 103. 
56Matter and Memory, P• 183. 
57Harald Hoffding, Modem Philosophers and Lectures on Bergson, trans. 
Alfred C. Mason (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 234; Jones, p. 267; 
Kolakowski, pp. 28-29. 
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Bergson faced the question squarely. First, he claims language can be used 
in a manner which goes against its normal, spatializing and categorizing function. 
This is the language of metaphor and imagery. There are times, Bergson claims, 
when a metaphor captures meaning more accurately than scie~tific prose and the 
later is, in fact, more falsifying than the former. 
Comparisons and metaphors will here suggest what cannot be expressed. That 
will not constitute a detour; it will amount to going straight to the goal .... 
Abstract ideas alone would, therefore, in such a case, be inviting us to imagine 
mind on the model of matter and to think it by transposition, that is, in the 
exact mea:J;ring of the word, by metaphor. Let us not be duped by appearances: 
there are cases in which it is imagery in language which knowingly expresses 
the literal meaning, and abstract language which unconsciously expresses itself 
figuratively. The moment we reach the spiritual world, the image, if it merely 
seeks to sug~est, may give us the direct vision, while the abstract term, which is 
spatial in ongin and which claims to express, most frequently leaves us in 
metaphor.58 
Bergson also states that using an assortment of verbal descriptions will aid in 
expressing an intuition. By painting pictures of intuition from various sides it is 
hoped the inadequacies of the various perspectives will cap.cel each other out, 
allowing the reader to discover the nature of the intuition itself. 59 Thus when 
describing the intuition of one's duration he uses the metaphors of the umolling of a 
spool, the rolling up of a ball of thread, a spectrum of a thousand shades and an 
infinitely small piece of elastic.60 Each of these images is, in itself, incomplete 
''because no metaphor can express o~e of the two aspects [of duration: unity and 
multiplicity] without sacrificing the other."61 Duration is all these things at once. 
In the end, therefore, the purpose of philosophic discourse is not to describe 
the intuition, but to bring the reader to an intuitional experience of her own. 
58Creative Mind, pp. 48-49. 
59creative Mind, p. 195 .. 
60Creative Mind, pp. 192-194 
61Creative Mind, p. 194. 
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In this regard, the philosopher's sole aim should be to start up a certain effort 
which the utilitarian habits of mind of everyday life tend, in most men, to 
discourage. Now the image has at least the advantage of keeping us in the 
concrete. No image will reElace the int¢tion of duration, but many different 
images, taken from quite different orders of things, will be able, through the 
convergence of their action, to direct the co~fiousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to seize on. 
Bergson also believed that intuitions, as they reshaped our understanding of the 
world around us would have an effect on intellectual language itself. Intuition "will 
. ' 
arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of 
adopting the very movement of the inner life of things."63 Intuition can change our 
forms of symbolism. The example which Bergson provides most often of a new, 
more flexible conceptual scheme is the infinitesimal calculus.64 
Intuition, therefore, is both possible and expressible. It is a faculty which 
reaches duration itself. As such it is capable of doing philosophy. 
62creative Mind, p. 195. 
63Creative Mind, p. 224. 





Having determined that philosophy as the study of duration is possible only 
through the development of intuition, we must turn to Bergson's intuitional 
philosophic method. When doing philosophy it is necessary that we go against our 
habitual mode of thinking in order to intuit reality.1 We must also search for an 
adequate formulation of our findings and a means of verifying our results. 
Bergson both proposed and used an intuitional philosophic method. 
Intuition is the method of Bergsonism. Intuition is neither a feeling, an 
inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a full~ developed method, one of 
the most fully developed methods in philosophy. 
This method involves the use of intellect, for it is intellect, as we have said, that 
seeks to transcend itself. Intuition in its disinterest will not seek knowledge; 
intellect must pose it a question. 3 
The question is solved through an intuition of the real.4 Intuition's discovery 
reshapes intellectual concepts and is itself slightly altered as it is symbolized and 
expressed. In the end we will not be able to capture the full essence of the intuition 
but our intellectual concepts will have been pulled closer to life and made more 
1Creative Mind, p. 208. 
2Deleuze, p. 13 
3F. Gregoire, "La collaboration de l'futuition et de l'intelligence," Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie, 3 (1949):392. 
4Matter and Memocy, p. 69. 
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flexible.5 An advance will have been made. The intuition will remain with us, 
haunting us, 6 if you will, and constantly challenging and enlivening our thought. The 
method, then, involves a creative interchange between intellect and intuition.? 
This is just a brief sketch. In a way, however, this sketch is more accurate 
than the detailed analysis I am about to provide. Remember that the intuitional 
method is an art, not always repeatable in the same fashion. To nail it down to 
" . 
specific steps is artificial. The description below is like the outlines of feet painted 
on a dance class floor. To follow it woodenly can be called dancing-- but you'll 
never be Fred Astaire until you go beyond the painted feet on the floor. So, with 
that word of caution, let us proceed. 
The intuitional method has four steps. First, there is a negative work done by 
intellect which I call ~larification. Next there is the empirical work which, with 
effort, will give rise to an intuition. This I call positioning. Once an intuition has 
been received it must be wedded to a mea.nS of expression, changing and being 
changed by intellect. This joint work of intuition and intellect I name solidification. 
Last, verification takes place as the effects of the intuition are worked out. These 
stages: clarification, positioning, solidification and verification are my inventions --
my way of describing Bergson's process of philosophizing. They are too precise --
numbered feet painted on the floor. This point cannot be over stressed. 
5Creative Mind, p. 52. 
6Creative Mind, p. 128~ 
7Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 179; Copleston, p. 199. 
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Clarification 
The Problem with Language 
"A whole labor of clearing away is necessary in order to open up the way to 
inner experience."8 The first step in Bergson's philosophic method is the negative 
work of critiquing accepted concepts and presuppositions about reality. It is 
necessary to clear away,the philosophical mistakes committed by intellect. 
Philosophy begins by "eliminating ready-made concepts."9 
Intellect, as we have discussed, cuts reality into objects and develops 
language to corresponding to them.10 Language develops general, abstract ideas of 
two kinds; general concepts which overlook the uniqueness of each individual being 
and abstract ideas necessary to reconstitute a semblance of the real. By completing 
perception with conception 'we create ps~udo:..ideas.11 
It is this covering [language] that we ,must grasp in order to tear it off. But we 
shall grasp it only if we consider first its aspect and its structure, if in addition, 
we understand its intended purpose. It is spatial by nature and has a social 
utility. Spatiality therefore, and in this quite special sense, sociability, are in 
this case the real causes of the relativity of our knowledgei2 Brushing aside this 
veil, we get back to the immediate and reach an absolute. 
Philosophic problems are stated with words, and words were not created with 
pure speculation in mind, but instead ~ere created for practical purposes. It is 
necessary, therefore, to consider the question and the categories it implies and be 
sure those categories correspond to true articulations of the real. 
8Creative Mind, p. 53. 
9Creative Mind, p. 52. 
10Matter and Memmy, p. 183. 
11Creative Mind, p. 157. 
12Creative Mind, p. 29. 
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[Words] have most often been elaborated by the social organism in view of an 
object which has nothing to do with metaphysics. In order to form them 
society has cut out reality according to its needs. Why should philosophy 
accept a division which in all probability will not correspond to the 
articulations of the real? ... But the truth is that in philosophy and even 
elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing 
it, even more than of solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as soon as 
it is properly stated. By that I mean that its solution exists then, although it 
may remain hidden and, so to speak, covered up: the only thing left to do is to 
uncover it.13 
Philosophic problems must be analyzed to determine the categories they 
imply and then be restated. Once restated the answer is forthcoming. An 
understanding of _how the practical function of the intellect created the terms 
involved will result in ''brushing aside" the veil of language and allow us to "get back 
to the immediate and reach an absolute." General ideas must be analyzed to 
determine if they artificially carve reality and pseudo-ideas must be removed. Let 
us examine the second case first. 
Pseudo-problems 
When Bergson is faced with the philosophic problem of the existence of the 
universe he begins by discovering and analyzing the concepts involved. The 
philosopher asks why he 'or the universe or the Principle which created the universe 
exists.14 
Now, if I push these questions aside and go straight to what hides behind them, 
this is what I find:--Existence appears to me like a conquest over nought. I say 
to myself that there might be, that indeed there ought to be, nothing, and then 
I wonder that there is something.15 
The question resolves itself into the:relatiobship of the categories of 
"something" and "nothing" and can be restated "Wl~.y·is there something rather than 
nothing?" 
13Creative Mind, p. 58. 
14Creative Evolution, p. 275. 
15Creative Evolution, pp. 275-276. 
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Now, if we could prove that the idea of the nought, in the sense in which we 
take it when we oppose it to that of existence, is a pseudo-idea, the problems 
that are raised around it would become pseudo-problems.16 
Bergson shows that "nothing" is a pseudo-idea first by illustrating that while 
we can conceive of the annihilation of any number of individual things, we cannot 
conceive of the annihilation of everything~17 He uses a number of arguments to 
support this claim. He states that we cannot imagine the, non-existence of 
everything because we would have to exist ourselves in order to do so.18 He argues 
also that the idea of the non-existence of an object is actually made up of the idea of 
the object existing and the idea of its removal.19 Therefore, the idea of nothing 
actually has more content than the idea of something. 
Beyond these logical arguments he discusses the use. of negation in human 
language -- its derivation for the exigencies of human action. Negation in general is 
used as a warning or correction. It has a,social purpose. It warns that a different 
affirmation should be substituted for one proposed. For example, ''The table is not 
white," warns that something other than "The table is white," should be affirmed. 
The color to be affirmed is left undetermined, perhaps because it is unknown but 
more often because it was whiteness which was of interest.20 
Thus we rediscover how an idea was formed along the lines of action and 
how it is to be used. The word "nothing" is used when what interests us is 
substituted by something which does not.21 When your teenage son complains that 
there is nothing to eat in the house, he means nothing he was interested in eating is 
16Creative Evolution, p. 277. 
17Creative Evolution, pp. 278-298. 
18Creative Evolution, p. 279. 
19Creative Evolution, p. 286. 
2°Creative Evolution, pp. 288-289. 
21Creative Evolution, p. 281. 
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in the house. When we say a new apartment has nothing in it, we overlook the 
presence of air filling every nook and cranny because it is not air that is of interest 
to us in that situation. 
The word "nothing" is used when what is expected or desired is not there, but 
' ' 
never is there a ''hole" in our experience, never is there really "nothing" in the way 
philosophers use the term. Our experie~ce is complete and full, by "nothing" we 
mean the replacement of the thing which interests us by something else. Thus the 
use of "nothing". implies the existence of something: the replacement. 
Intellect is directed-by interests and its terms have their true meaning in the 
context of interest. ·To use "nothing" to mean the non-existence of everything is a 
pseudo-idea, created when the interested, intellectua), word is transported into the 
; 
realm of disinterested speculation. Once "nothing" is defined by its use, the 
question, "Why is there something, rather. than' nothing?" becomes absurd. 
"Nothing" is something.· .Bergson applies the same critique to the pseudo-ideas of 
"disorder"22 and "possibility."23 
Realizing that the nonexistence qf one thing always means the existence of 
another opens the way to an intuition of the real. Taking away our interest in the 
missing object, we see {hat there is always something present. 
Suppress all interest, all feeling, and there is nothing left but the reality that 
flows, together with the knowledge ever renewed that it impresses on-us of its 
present state. 24 
With nothing filtered out by our interes~, we experience reality totally, as it is. Thus 
intellectual analysis of pseudo-ideas can lead to an intUition. 
22Creative Evolution, pp. 220-222 .. 
23Creative Mind, pp. 21-22, 107-125. 
24Creative Evolution, p. 295. 
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False Articulations of Reality 
In the case of pseudo-concepts, clarification removes the concept and all the 
problems related to them. While recognition of pseudo-ideas reveals the problem 
to be a pseudo-problem, analysis of general concepts to determine if they 
correspond to true articulations of the real merely sets the stage for further work on 
the problem. 
Bergson st;;ltes that intellect, as it creates objects and the words that 
correspond to them, carves reality however it desires. This carving can, and often 
does, go against nature's true articulations. 'Bergson writes: 
Plato compares the good dialectician to the skillful cook who carves the 
animal without breaking its bones, by following the articulations marked out 
by nature. An intelligence which always proceeded thus would really be an 
intelligence turned toward speculation. , But action,~nd in particular 
fabrication, requires the opposite mental tendency. 
Quoting this passage, Deleuze summarizes B~rgson's method as "The determination 
of true problems or of genuine differences in kind."26 
An example of this part of the method is evident in Bergson's consideration 
of the problem of perception in Matter and Memory. The general concept of 
perception is what must be analyzed in this case. By clarifying what perception is 
and showing how past philosophical concepts of it have been guilty of false 
articulations of reality, Bergson finds the middle ground between idealism and 
realism. 
25creative Evolution, p. 156. 
26Deleuze, p. 33. Deleuze is wrong to limit Bergson's method almost 
exclusively to this first step, but he does an excellent job of describing it. (He 
mentions, but does not give a description of the intuitional experience which I place 
in the "positioning" step.) 
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In the past, philosophers had considered perception to be purely speculative. 
Both idealist and realists agreed on this point.27 They also agreed that memory and 
perception differed only in degree, not in kind. 28 The truth, according to Bergson, is 
that perception is not purely speculative, but oriented to action.29 This means it is 
different in kind from memory and more closely aligned to reflex action.30 We have 
described Bergson's theory of perception above. By exhibiting perception as our 
reaction to the world around us, Bergson affirms the reality of objects, but without 
turning perception into a mystery as the realist does. He explains representation, as 
the idealist is able to do; but also explains the regularity of natural laws, which the 
idealist cannot do.31 
Bergson's discussion of the nature of perception in Matter and Memmy is 
complex and this brief summary does not do it justice. It will suffice, however, to 
exhibit two aspects of his method. First, he seeks to rediscover true articulations of 
the real in order to resolve a philosophic problem. He states that memory and 
perception differ in kind, not degree; while perception and reflex are of the same 
kind. Also, he discovers and questions an assumption common to both sides of the 
ISSUe. 
According to Kolakowski, questioning a shared assumption is Bergson's 
"favourite method of analysis."32 Discovering a shared postulate will aid in pointing 
to a false articulation of the real. Bergson says: 
27Matter and Memo:ry, p. 28. 
28Matter and Memo:ry, pp. 66-68. 
29Matter and Memo:ry, p. 28, 158. 
30Matter and Memo:ry, p. 69, pp. 23-24. 
31Matter and Memo:ry, pp. 26-28; Hanna, p. 13. 
32Kolakowski, pp. 6-7. 
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if we look closely at the two doctrines [realism and idealism], we shall discover 
in them a common postulate, which we may formulate thus: perception has a 
wholly speculative interest; it is pure knowledge .... Now, it is just this postulate 
we dispute.33 
Questioning perception's speculative nature led Bergson to the action-oriented 
description of perception which resolved the realism/idealism impasse. 
We must remember that intellect is the habitual faculty of human cognition. 
The false articulations of reality which intellect creates form our view of the world, a 
view we share in our language. 34 Therefore, when we discover proponents of 
radically different philosophic systems agreeing on a postulate, the chances are good 
that the postulate embodies a cutting of reality necessitated by intellect. If we 
" ' 
question that postulate we will be driven to undo intellect's cutting, which is only 
possible through direct apprehension of reality through an intuition. Once again 
analysis has led us to intuition. 
Clarification, then, by removing pseudo-ideas and redefining general 
concepts to fit more accurately true articulations of reality, is the first step in the 
intuitive process. By clari:fyi.Iig and critiquing intellect's action-oriented handling of 
a philosophic problem we brush aside the veil which separates us from an intuitive 
vision of reality. 
PositiorP.ng 
Gathering Images 
' ' ' 
Bergson has complained that philosophy has lacked precision. 35 
The fact is that a self-contained (vrai) system is an assemblage of conceptions 
so abstract, and consequently so vast, that it might contain, aside from the real, 
33Matter and Memmy, p. 28. 
34rfwo Sources, p. 104. 
35Creative Mind, p. 9. 
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all the possible and even impossible. The only explanation we should accept 
as satisfactory is one which fits tightly to its object, with no space between 
then, no crevice in which any other explanation might equally well be lo~ed; 
one which fits the object only and to which alone the object lends itself.3 
We have seen how clarification eliminates the impossible and the possible 
from our conceptions as well as more clearly delimiting th~ object of our study. In 
order to develop an explanation which fits the object completely and uniquely, 
however, we must have recourse to intuition. Intuition is "the sympathy by which 
one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there 
is unique and consequently inexpressible in it."37 
How do we go about having an intuition? Since in~ition is by definition 
immediate knowledge there are no steps to describe in the process of intuiting.38 
Intuition is a simple act.39 However, there are some things we can do in order to 
elicit an intuition. 
Let me offer an analogy in order to explain. Sight is analogous to intuition --
all we need do is look and we see. However, there are things we can do to improve 
our chances of seeing a particular object. Obstacles in our line of vision must be 
removed-- we may have to step closer to the object in order to see it clearly. We 
need to get into the right position in order to see. Yet seeing itself is just seeing -- as 
soon as our eyes light upon the object we see it. 
In order to have an intuition, we must position ourselves so as to coincide 
with the object. 40 To do so, we install ourselves in the flow of our own duration and 
36creative Mind, p. 9. 
37Creative Mind, p. 190. 
38cf. Rotenstreich, p. 336. 
39Creative Mind, p. 191. 
40Creative Mind, p. 190. 
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then use that experience as a bridge to the object's duration. Bergson is confident 
we can all intuit our personal duration without difficulty.41 
It is a rare individual who cannot intuit his own duration; but it is also a rare 
individual who can make the effort to intuit another object.42 Bergson describes 
what the aspiring metaphysician can do to elicit an intuition. We can position 
ourselves for an intuition by "piling up" images of the object until we realize the 
whole from which these images flow. 43 
No image will replace the intuition of duration, but many different images, 
taken from quite different orders of things, will be able, through the 
convergence of their a~tioh, to direct the consciousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to seize on. By choosing images as dissimilar 
as possible, any one of them will be prevented from usurping the place of the 
intuition it is instructed to call forth, since it would then be driven out 
immediately by its rivals. 44 
To "position" oneself is; to so surround yourself with different views of the subject 
that you are forced inside in your effort to view them all. This is, of course, a highly 
metaphorical description, but explaining Bergson any other way is impossible. 
What are the images used to elicit an intuition? Bergson uses the word 
"image" in two senses .. In Matter and Memory Bergson uses the word "image" for 
the immediate data of our perception, which is something less than, but not 
something different from, the thing itsel£.4? A concept, on the other hand, is a 
symbol of the image.46 When Bergson tells us that the use of images will keep us "in 
41Creative Mind, p. 83. · 
42Two Sources pp. 212-213, pp. 249-50; Creative Evolution, pp. 200, 
267-268. . 
4~wo Sources, p. 222. 
44Creative Mind, p. 195. 
45Matter and Memory, p. 9, pp. 35-36. 
46Creative Evolution, pp. 160-161; Creative Mind, pp. 195-196. 
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the concrete" it seems he intends this meaning of image as opposed to abstract 
concepts. 47 
47 
However, Bergson tells us to use images to provoke intuition immediately 
after he has used the metaphors of the unrolling of a spool, the rolling up of a ball of 
thread, a spectrum of a thousand shades and an infinitely small piece of elastic to 
describe inner duration.48 He calls these metaphors images.49 By "image" does he 
mean immediate perception or metaphor? A footnote to the passage clarifies the 
situation. Bergson writes: 
The images referred to are those which can arise in the mind of the 
philosopher when he wishes to make his thought known to others. I am 
disregarding the image, near-neighbor to intuition, whichJohe philosopher may 
himself need, and which frequently remains unexpressed. 
It seems the philosopher uses metaphor ~o express his intuition, 51 although the 
images of perception are what evoked th~ intuition to begin with. The image as 
metaphor is the expression of the image as perception. We can allow the word 
"image" to remain ambiguoils, for both the immediate data of perception and the 
' ' ' 
" ' ' 
metaphors used to express them ~an eli~t an intuition. 
It is important to stress that the intuition you have is not the result of piecing 
together all the images or a synj:hes~ of them. It is something entirely separate from 
the images, although the images spring from it. The various images you have of the 
object can help bring up an intuition, but will not constitute it. You must have an 
experience of the object itself. Bergson writes: "But metaphysical intuition, although 
47creative Mind, p. 195. 
48Creative Mind, pp. 192-194 
49Creative Mind, p. 194. 
5°creative Mind, p. 195n. 
51creative Mind, p. 48. 
one can achieve it only by means of material knowledge, is an entirely different 
thing from the summary or synthesis of this knowledge."52 
Bergson describes an artist who has made sketches of various Parisian 
scenes: 
Now at the bottom of all the sketches made in Paris the stranger will probably 
write "Paris" by way of reminder. And as he has really seen Paris, he will be 
able, by descending from the original intuition of the whole, to place his 
sketches in it and thus arrange them in relation to one another. But there is 
no way of performing the opposite. operation; even with an infinity of sketches 
as exact as you like, even With the word "Paris" to indicate that they must bear 
close connection, it is impossible to travel back to an intuition one has not had, 
and gain the impression of Paris if one has never seen Paris. The point is that 
we are not dealin~ liere with parts of the whole, but with na,tes taken on the 
thing as a whole. . 
The pictures the artist has made. of Paris can serve as reminders, calling up a 
memory of his visit there. His memory of Paris, however, is much fuller than the 
pictures. Imagine yourself the memories you recall when looking at snapshots of a 
vacation. There is more in the memories then in the pictures. The memory is the 
original of which the pictures are copies. The relationship is similar between images 
and intuition they evoke. An important difference is that by positioning ourselves 
for an intuition we are attempting to 'Call up an experience for the first time, not 
revive a memory of it. We are attempting to see an object with which we are 
familiar in a new way. 
We must already be familiar with the object in order to collect images of it. 
We receive these perception-images from scientific research and personal 
experience. 
For one does not obtain frqm reality an intuition, that is to say, a spiritual 
harmony with its innermost quality if one has not gained its confidence by a 
long comradeship with its superficial manifestations. And it is not a question 
simply of assimilating the outstanding facts; it is necessary to accumulate and 
fuse such an enormous mass of them that one may be assured, in this fusion, of 
52Creative Mind, pp. 236-237. 
53creative Mind, pp. 201-202. 
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neutralizing by one another all the preconceived and premature ideas 
observers may have deposited unknowingly in their observations. Only thus 
does the raw material of the known facts emerge. 54 
We must be conversant with as much as possible of what science has to say 
about the object of our study. Bergson insists on the need for scientific study and 
points to the scientific background of his writings as evidence of his respect for 
scientific research. 55 His major works are qased on in-depth study of the relevant 
scientific data. He studied aphasia for six years before writing Matter and Memmy 
and spent eleven years studying in preparation for Creative Evolution. 56 In Creative 
Mind he writes: 
The masters of modem philosophy have been men who had assimilated all the 
material of the science of their time. And the partial eclipse of metaphysics 
since the last half century has been caused more than anything else by the 
extraordinary difficulty the philosopher e~eriences today in making contact 
with a science already much too scattered. 7 
Even though we assimilate as much scientific observation as possible, we 
keep in mind science's practical orientation. We must not reintroduce the false 
concepts and presuppositions we discarded during the clarification step. We view 
the data in a new way. This is why it is necessary to gather "an enormous mass" of 
data so that prejudices of one kind or a~other will be balanced ~ut. 
54creative Mind, p. 236. 
55creative Mind, pp. 78-80. 
56Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and the Evolution of Science," pp. 10, 12. 
57 Creative Mind, p. 236. 
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Changing Rhythm 
With all these images about us we attempt to obtain a pure perception of the 
object ourselves. This is intuition. " ... in pure perception we are actually placed 
outside ourselves; we touch the reality of the· object in an immediate intuition."58 
Pure perception takes place in the object, not in us. 59 Thus, through a pure 
perception we can "coincide" with the object and know it "from within".60 This 
occurs when we recognize the rhythm of the object's own duration and are able to 
apprehend that rhythm. 
To explain this, let us look again at a passage partially quoted above: 
No image will replace the intuition of duration, but many different images, 
taken from quite different orders of things, will be able, through the 
convergence of their action, to direct the consciousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to se~e on. By choosing images as dissimilar 
as possible, any one of them will be prevented from usurping the place of the 
intuition it is instructed to call forth, since it would then be driven out · . 
immediately by its rivals. By seeing that in spite of their differences in aspect 
they all demand of our mind the same kind of attention and, as it were, the 
same degree of tension, one will gradually accustom the consciousness to a 
particular and definit~ly determined dispositio~ precisely the one it will have 
to adopt in order to appear unveiled to 1tself.61 
When we are surrounded by many ima~es of the object we notice that they all 
demand the "same degree of tension." In the passage quoted, Bergson is discussing 
the intuition of our own duration, and therefore concludes that when we achieve this 
degree of tension the mind is unveiled to itself. We can infer from this that if we 
notice the same degree of tension in all images of an external object and can tune 
our duration to that same tension, we will have tlie object unveiled to us. 
58Matter and Memo:ry, p. 75. 
59Matter and Memo:ry, pp: 43, 61, 64, 75. 
6°Creative Mind, p. 190, 191. 
61creative Mind, p. 195. 
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Different objects have their own rhythm of duration, each flows at its own 
rate.62 Matter has the fastest, most repetitive duration; pure spirit (God) is eternal 
duration.63 Our mind has its rhythin, also. In normal perception we contract a 
plurality of instantaneous perceptions giyen during one pulse of our own duration 
into one perception with the aid of memory. 
The rhythm of our duration is a function of the degree of freedom we 
possess. The more freedom we have, the more we are master of our actions, the 
greater the number of instantaneous pulses of duration we can combine in one 
perception. Thus human perception contracts more instantaneous duration in one 
"glance" than animal perception, animal more than vegetable, and so on.64 The 
rhythm of matter is faster than ours, closer to being instantaneous, while the rhythm 
of God would be much slower. He would contract the greatest number of instants 
into one perception. 
The contraction of a series of instantaneous perceptions into one is achieved 
by memory. Thus memory is the source of subjectivity in knowledge; it imposes the 
rhythm of our own duration on to our perceptions.65 Therefore, objectivity can be 
gained by expunging memory from perception, i.e. to return to pure perception. In 
pure perception we would perceiv~ the object according to the pulses of its own 
duration, rather than our own. 
For if we follow to the end the principle according to which the subjectivity of 
our perception consists, above all, in the share taken by memory, we shall say 
that even the sensible qualities of matter would be known in themselves, from 
62creative Mind, p. 218. 
63Creative Mind, p. 221. 
64Creative Evolution, p. 301. 
65Matter and Memory, p. 34. 
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within and not from without, could we but disengage them from that particular 
rhythm of duration which characterizes our consciousness. 66 
If we can relax or contract the tension of our own duration to match the objects 
duration we will apprehend it as it is . 
. . . the intuition of our duration, far from leaving us suspended in the void as 
pure analysis would do, puts us in contact with a whole continuity of durations 
which we should try to follow either downwardly or upwardly: in both cases we 
can dilate ourselves indefinitely _by a more and more vigorous effort, in both 
cases transcende ourselves. In the first case, we advance toward a duration 
more and more scattered, whose palpitations, more rapid than ours, dividing 
our simple sensation, dilute its quality into quantity: atthe limit would be the 
pure homogeneous, the pure repetition by which we shall define materiality. In 
advancing in the other direction, we go toward a duration which stretches, 
tightens, and becomes more and more intensified: at the limit would be 
eternity. This time not only conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death, 
but an eternity of life. It would be a living and consequently still moving 
eternity where mrr own duration would find itself like the vibrations in light, 
and which would be the concretion of all duration as materiality is its 
dispersion. Between these two extreme limits moves intuition, and this 
movement is metaphysics itself.67 
Intuitional metaphysics ise the dilation and contraction of our own duration to match 
the duration of other objects and thus know them in themselves. This is a 
metaphorical description of intuition -- all this dilating and stretching and 
contracting -- but as we have discussed, as we get closer and closer to intuition 
metaphors are more exact than straight prose eand yet still leave some of the 
experience unexpressed. 
Having an intuition of an object is an experience of gestalt. You have started 
with a multitude of images, but suddenly you see the object itself in its wholeness. 
Bergson describes the experience of recapturing the intuition of another e 
philosopher in his lecture "Philosophical Intuition." Mter in-depth study of the 
philosopher's complex system we suddenly e.werience it as a whole. 
In the first place, its complication diminishes. Then the various parts fit into 
one another. Finally, the whole is brought together into a single point, which 
66Matter and Memory, p. 69. 
67Creative Mind, p. 221. 
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we feel could be ever more closely approached even though there is no hope 
of reaching it completely. 
In this pomt is something simple, infinitely simple ... 68 
This unity and simplicity is not achieved by a synthesis of the images. It is not 
the combination of images, but the source of those images. We use images to 
achieve the intuition, but the images do not make up the intuition. 
Gunter seems to imply that intuition is synthesis. He says: 
... for Bergs~n, if intellectual analysis spatializes and fragments reality, it 
should be possible to return, though abstractly, to reality by picking up these 
spatial pieces and putting them back together again. 69 
He also says: 
Philosophy, unlike scientific empiricism, aims not at practical effectiveness but 
at a more and more encompassirig rejlection, that is, ~ intuition. It takes the 
inverse direction from intellect and instead of fragmentin~ what the intellect 
has to teach, tries to weld together the intellect's observational and theoretical 
'atoms' and, without losing sight of particulars, to bind them together into a 
synthetic intellectual picture of the wodd. 70 
This interpretation is not in line with J;lergson's thought. He warns us that we 
cannot achieve an intuition by piecing together the elements which intellect has 
separated out of the object. 71 Be~gson states clearly: 
But metaphysical intuition, although one can achieve it only by means of 
material knowledge, is an entirely different thing from the summary or 
synthesis of this knowledge. 72 
From our clarification, research and effort we gain a vision of the object in its 
entirety and uniqueness. Suddenly the opposing viewpoints philosophers have taken 
68Creative Mind, p. 128. 
69Gunter, "Bergsonian Method.and The Evolution of Science," pp. 29-30. 
70Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and The Evolution of Science," p. 31. 
71Creative Mind, p. 196 
72creative Mind, pp. 236-237. 
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on the subject are perfectly understandable and yet dissolve for we can see how each 
was created by emphasizing one or another aspect of the reality itself.73 
Finally, philosophy thus defined does not consist in choosing between concepts 
and taking sides with one school, but in seeking a unique intuition from which 
one can just as easily come down again to the various concepts, because one 
has placed oneself above the division of the schools. 74 
Philosophy is defined as "seeking a unique intuition" for each problem it studies. 
Now we have removed intellect's falsifying work through clarification and 
gained a direct vision of the object of our study through intuition. The next step is 
to express the findings of our study and then to test them. 
Solidification 
So far we have cleared away the work of intellect and gone against the usual 
habits of our mind in order to install ourselves in reality itself. It is easy to see why 
Bergson calls intuition a reverse mode of thinking.75 Instead of pulling the qualities 
which interest us out of the flow of reality, as intellect does; we place ourselves into 
the real in a reverse movement. 
We cannot stop here with our intuition. As stated above, an intuitional 
philosophy would be useless if its findings could not be expressed. It is necessary to 
express the intuition so it can be tested and so that other philosophers can share our 
work.76 We started by rem'oving concepts, but now it is time to return to them. 
Bergson's method, if it dispenses with symbols, does so only briefly and--what 
is more important--only provisionally. Symbols (including both the most 
73Creative Mind, pp. 197-8; p. 207; cf. p. 205 and Matter and Memory 
pp. 26-28. ' ' 
74creative Mind, p. 207. 
75creative Mind, p. 224. 
76Gregoire, p. 405. Bergson stated that his method of philosophy, being 
truly empirical, would be a collaborative enterprise. 
abstract language and images) are not only necessary to reach intuition~ they 
are also necessary to express intuition, to formalize it in a testable way. 7 
Even the conceptualization of the intuition is a reverse mode of thinking. 
Bergson tells us that to "think consists ordinarily in going from concepts to things, 
and not from things to concepts."78 The intuitional method removes concepts at the 
start and goes to the object instead. It is only after the intuition of the object that 
we return to concepts . 
. . . if metaphysics is possible, it can 'only be an effort to re-ascend the slope 
natural to the work of thought, to place oneself immediately, through a 
dilation of the 'mind, in the thing one is studying, in short, to go from reality to 
concepts and not from concepts to reality.79 · 
I call this process of going from reality to the concept solidification because 
the fluidity of the real is made solid by static concepts.80 The intuitional 
. . 
philosopher will struggle, however, to express his intuition with the most fluid 
concepts possible. 81 He will have. recourse to metaphor and imagery because in this 
case a metaphor is actually more accurat~ than scientific prose. 82 
Instead of using "ready-made" concepts, it may be necessary to create new 
concepts to describe the object.83 Alfred North Whitehead, who was heavily 
influenced by Bergson, 84 writes: 
77Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 174. 
78Creative Mind, p. 208. 
79Creative Mind, p. 216. 
8°Creative Mind, p. 228. 
81Creative Mind, p. 224. 
82Creative Mind, pp. 48-49. 
83creative Mind, p. 198. 
84Charles Hartshorne, Creativity in American Philosophy, (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1984 ), p. 5.; Hanna, p. 22. 
55 
Philosophers qm never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first 
principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way 
inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign 
to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized 
as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative 
leap.85 
With all his effort the philosopher will be unable to fully express his intuition. 
As we said in the previous chapter, the philosopher's true goal is not to express the 
intuition, but to elicit for her readers the same intuition he has experienced. This is 
the "imaginative leap" to which Whitehead referred~ The philosopher provides the 
images and metaphors her readers need to"position themselves for an intuition. 
Bergson has himself explaine9 at length the function of the image in his work. 
As he sees it, the aim of the intuitive philosopher is to excite at each stage of 
his reflection corresponding intuitions in the mind of the reader.86 
Through the philosopher's effort to express intuition, our symbol systems are 
enriched.87 We come up with new, more flexible concepts in order to. express the 
intuition of the object.88 Bergson uses the infinitesimal calculus often as an example 
of symbolic restructuring. An example Bergson does not give, but which seems clear 
to me is the advance from Aristotelian syllogisms to the propositional calculus. Our 
symbol systems move closer to reality with each intuition, but will never reach it, 
precisely because it is reality and they are symbols. 
Verification 
Bergson, as an empiricist, always sought to verify the findings of his 
intuitional method. This verification is performed by intellect. It is true that at 
85 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected edition, ed. 
David Ray Griffen and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 
p.4. 
'86 Alexander, p. 17. 
. 
87Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 174. 
88Creative Mind, p. 198. 
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times the finding cannot be directly verified, but Bergson seeks a point of contact 
between intuitional philosophy and intellectual science where the vision he has had 
will make a difference. 89 
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For example, when attempting to verify his views of perception and memory 
in Matter and Memory. he has to find an effect of his hypothesis which can be 
verified, since the hypothesis itself cannot be. In order to prove that the brain is an 
instrument of action, not representation he finds that e cannot study perception 
itself. He says that ''with regard to external perception, the thesis which we dispute 
and that which we substitute for it lead to pr~cisely the same consequence."90 
However, the two hypotheses have different consequences for memory. Therefore, 
he turns instead to the study of memory and.aphasia to show that memory stands in 
relation to perception as he has propos~ d. 91 
There will always be 3: way of verifying the intuition. Matter - which intellect 
apprehends sufficiently -- and life have points of contact, a boundary along which 
the effects of one are felt by the other.92 Thus we can always discover a material 
effect of intuition which can be studied by intellect. Pete Gunter tells us that "if we 
can find no possible verification our putative insight is not an intuition at all."93 
There is a second way in which the intuition can be verified. It must be 
fruitful. This is what Bergson refers to as a second type of clarity. The first kind of 
clarity, which intellect provides, is that of the clear and distinct idea. It is clear in 
89Creative Mind, p. 50. 
90Matter and Memmy. p. 75. 
91Matter and Memmy, pp. 74-76. 
92Creative Mind, p. 50. 
93Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 172. 
itself.94 The second kind of clarity belongs to the idea which is obscure itself, but 
lends clarity to others: 
It is the clarity of the radically new and absolutely simple idea, which catches 
as it were an intuition. As we cannot reconstruct it with pre-existing elements, 
since it has no elements ... our first impulse is to say it is incomprehensible. 
But let us accept it provisionally, let us go with it through the various 
departments of our knowledge; we shall see that, itself obscure, it dissipates 
obscurities. by it the problems we considered insoluble will resolve · 
themselves, or rather, be dissolved, eithrr to disappear definitively, or to 
present themselves in some other way.9 . 
A true intuition will show how antinomies about the object have developed 
and how they will be resolved. Each side of the argument will become 
understandable as an overemphasis of one side or the other of the reality under 
study and a new position will become apparent which resolves the conflict between 
the existing positions.96 We have discussed briefly Bergson's resolution of the 
conflict between realism and idealism above. · 
The intuition, expressed and verified by intellect, will be clarified and new 
avenues of research will open up. Bergson continues the passage just quoted: 
From what [the intuition] has done for these problems, it will in its turn, 
benefit. Each one of them, intellectual by nature, will communicate to it 
something of its intellectuality. Thus intellectualized, this idea can be aimed 
anew at problems which will have been of use to it after having made use of it; 
better still, it will clear up the obscurity which surrounded them, and will, as a 
result, become itself still clearer.97 · 
The intuitional philosophic method involves a creative interchange between 
intellect and intuition. Intellect begins the process by critiquing its own abstracts. 
Intuition picks up the pro~ess, providing a direct contact with reality. Then intuition 
and intellect recombine, expressing and verifying the discovery. This process 
94Creative Mind, pp. 39-40. 
95creative Mind, p. 40. 
96Creative Mind, p. 207. 
97 Creative Mind, p. 40. 
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develops and clarifies both our symbol systems and the intuition itself and reveals 
new areas to which the method can be applied. Thus the cycle begins again, 
intellect posing problems to intuition and intuition answering with its insight, both 




In Bergson's philosophy reality is duration, a flow of creativity. Therefore 
philosophy, the study of ultimate reality, needs a method which can apprehend the 
mobility of duration. 
Intellect is m..:suited to this task. Developed as a tool to facilitate action 
intellect is not interested in reality as it is; but rather is directed toward those aspect 
of reality which are of use for human action. Therefore it extracts from the flow of 
reality only those qualities which are of interest to it. It removes those qualities 
' ' 
from duration and conceives them as spatial in order to facilitate action upon them. 
' 
Lastly, it categorizes the object with the aid of memory, recognizing the object not as 
it is, but as it resembles other objects. The result is a partial knowledge of the 
object devoid of duration and lacking its uniqueness. 
When intellect, faced with this partial perception of reality, attempts to 
complete perception with conception it creates abstract ideas of two kinds. First, it 
creates general ideas which encompass a class of objects, overlooking the 
uniqueness of each one. These general ideas,often embody false articulations of 
reality. Second, inteliect develops abstract conceptions, artificially u~ed to 
reconstitute the flow of reality. These abstract ideas are often pseudo-ideas. 
Intuition, on the other haild, is direct ,coincidence with reality. It consists of 
pure perception in which we apprehend the object according to the rhythm of its 
own duration. Therefore intuition apprehends the object as it is, without 
eliminating aspects of it or spatializing it. Intuition apprehends duration itself. 
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Therefore intuition must be the cornerstone of philosophic method. Bergson 
developed and used a method of this type. His philosophic method involves a 
creative interchange between intellect and intuition. Intelle.ct critiques its own 
abstractions and- gathers data which serve as the starting point for intuition. 
- . 
In the possession of the multitude o{data, the philosopher dilates his mind, 
suppressing memory, and attempts to discern th~ rhythm of the object's duration. 
Through this violent effort he may achieve an intuition of the object. 
The intuition then offers itself back to intellect, creating, fluid concepts in an 
effort to express itself and thus reshaping intellect's symbol systems. Although full 
. 
success in expressing .the intuition will never be gained, the philosopher may su~ceed 
in evoking the same intuition in his readers through metaphorical description of his 
' . -
intuitional experience. In the meantime, intellect's' symbol systems will be brought 
closer to reality. 
Intellect provides the verification for intuition, finding a place along the 
' ~ ' ~ 
border between its own and· intuition's proper domains where the hypothesis can be 
tested. It also recognizes the fruitfulness of a true intuition: its ability to resolve 
existing antinomies and to indicate avenues of fresh research. 
Once Bergson's views on intellect, intuition and their relationship have been 
made clear, charges of irratim;uilism are revealed to be groundless. Gunter writes: 
An insight which enriches our symbol-systems, rather than disrupting ·or 
merely denyi~g them, is not irratio~alisj in any ordinary sense of the term. 
Moreover, anJnsight which is capable· of doing so. must contain'conceptual 
content. This is precisely Bergson) contention: "My; intuition is reflection." 
[Creative Mind, p. 103] Intuition thus appears to be a\iynamic kind of 
reasoning, rather than some sort of evasion of reason. One is hard-pressed to 
think of a definition of "irrational" or "anti-intellectual" which could be 
plausibly applied to such a process.1 · 
1Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," pp. 174-175. 
61 
Bergson has great respect for the sciences; the data they provide are 
necessary to evoke an intuition. Intellect plays an important role in the intuitional 
method, providing the initial clarification, aiding in the eXpression of intuition and 
instrumental in its verification. 
Maritain argues that Bergson was forced to an irrationalist position because 
he developed his concept of elan vital in Creative Evolution without first working 
out a theory of knowledge. Maritain claims that Bergson refJ,Ised to choose between 
realism and idealism in Matter and Memory, and it is this failur~ which left him 
without a foundation for a rational epistemology.2 
Obviously this position is based on a total misunderstanding of Matter and 
Memory and Bergson's epistemology. Bergson does not need to choose between 
realism and idealism in Matter and Memory because his novel conception of the 
mind/body relation provides a third alternative which resolves the disagreement 
between the two while at the same time explaining perception and conception more 
adequately than either. 
I have used examples from Matter and Memory to show how Bergson used 
the intuitional method in that work. Much of Bergson's epistemology was already 
worked out by the time of Matter and Memory's writing.3 Anyone who could read 
Matter and Memory and not see that it contains a fully developed theory of 
perception upon which the rest of Bergson's epistemology is based, has entirely 
missed the point. Also "An Introduction to Metaphysics" was' pub"lished four years 
before Creative Evolution. If there is a irrational epistemology in Bergson (which 
there is not) it cannot be because the con~eption of elan vital propounded in 
Creative Evolution forced Bergson to accept it. 
2Maritain, Ransoming the Time, p. 66. 
3Gunter, Bibliography, p. 2. 
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Bergson's critique of intellect is not as unfounded as Maritain claims, nor as 
destructive. Intellect remains an important and useful faculty of human knowledge. 
Bergson is not an irrationalist.4 
Claims that his philosophy leads to a dead end are equally unfounded. 
Gunter agrees: 'I< 
Intuition is ... so far from being a "dead end" for Bergson that if we are not 
careful to formulate his position clearly, he begins to seem overly preoccupied 
with "results": i.e., with verifiable, "useful," experimental consequences.5 
Intuition can be expressed, although it will not be expressed with clear and 
distinct scientific prose nor will it be expressed completely. Through metaphor and 
imagery the intuition can be approximated and a corresponding intuition may be 
evoked in the reader. 
Intuition can be verified. There will always be a material effect of any 
intuition which can then be tested by scientific observation. The intuition will 
provide insight into philosophic problems; clarifying them however obscure it 
remains itself. Therefore Bergson's intUitional philosophic method cannot be 
considered a dead end. 
Although Bergson's method is difficult it is possible and useful. It seems that 
other than Bergson himself, however, no one has made a disciplined attempt to use 
it. Perhaps, the time has come for such an effort. 
4Alexander, p. 8. 
5Gunter, "Bergson's Philosophical Method and Its Applications to the 
Sciences," p. 174. 
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